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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature ofthe Case 
Appeal from the district court's, (sitting in an appellate capacity), denial of 
appellant's, (hereafter "Beck"), appeal from the magistrate court's decision denying 
Beck's MOTION TO SUPPRESS evidence and admissions/confessions. 
B. Procedural History 
Beck was charged with possession of paraphernalia, pled "not guilty", jury trial was 
set, a motion to suppress evidence and admissions/confessions was filed, Beck submitted 
a memorandum and affidavit in support, a hearing was set, conducted, at which time the 
motion was denied. The Magistrate then signed an ORDER prepared by the state with 
two modifications. An Idaho Criminal Rule 11, (hereafter "ICR"), plea agreement 
preserving the issue of the denial of the ICR 12(b) and an appeal were filed in the district 
court, which upheld the magistrate's decision in a MEMORANDUM DECISION, 
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ORDER AND APPELLATE JUDGMENT. A timely appeal was filed, this brief in 
support follows. 
Statement of Facts 
The Beck and his girlfriend were sleeping in the Beck's tent which was located in the 
Mack's Creek campground near Lucky Peak reservoir in Boise County, Idaho. The tent 
was halfway falling down, and, "the door was wide open", (Idaho Criminal Rule 12(b) 
Hearing Transcript, (hereafter "Tr"), p 13,116-14). The tent was on a campsite 
designated by the Army Corps of Engineers, (Tr p 21, 11 19-22). The campsite was 
discemable from other campsites, (Tr p 22,115-10). A holey-burnt-residue laden can, 
(hereafter "can"), with a plant stem was found outside of the tent, (Tr p 13, 1115-19). The 
can was located within two feet of the entrance of the tent where Beck was sleeping, and 
the officer walked within two feet said entrance and seized the can, (Tr p13, 1122-25, p 
14, 11 3-6). The officer approached the tent, and walked "around the tent. And while 
walking around the tent, I found a beer can next to the tent ... ", (Tr p 13,11 15-16). The 
officer did not possess a search warrant at the time he entered the curtilage of the 
campsite, (Tr p 20, 1122-24). The beer can was, "just left of the tent next to a tree.", (Tr p 
13,1122-23). The officer then, "hollered in, woke up Mr. Beck's girlfriend, had her wake 
him up, then had him come out and sit on a lawn chair ... ", (Tr 18, 11 7-10). When first 
questioned, the defendant denied possession of the can, (Tr p 24, 11 8-13). The defendant 
was not afforded his Miranda rights after denying possession of the can, was not 
provided with an attorney, and was not informed by the officer that he was free to leave, 
(Tr p 24,1111-24). After the initial denial, Beck denied possession of the can more than 
once, (Tr p 24,1125, P 25, 111-7). After continued questioning, Beck made 
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admissions/confessions concerning the can, (Tr p 25, 11 5-10). Beck's campsite was 
located on the main trail that provided access to other campsites in the area, (Tr p 26, 11 8-
20). 
II. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Were the Beck's 4th Amendment Rights violated by the warrantless entry into the 
curtilage of his camp site? 
2. Were Beck's 5th and 6th Amendment Rights against self-incrimination violated by the 
unwarned and coercive questioning by law enforcement officers? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. The Beck's 4th Amendment Rights were violated by the warrantless entry into the 
curtilage of his camp site. 
The area between the trail and Beck's tent was curtilage. 
"In United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 107 S.Ct. 1134,94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987), the 
Supreme Court set forth four factors to be considered in determining whether an area 
surrounding a home comes within the definition of curtilage for Fourth Amendment 
purposes. These factors are: (1) the proximity to the home of the area claimed to 
be curtilage; (2) whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home; 
(3) the nature of the uses to which the area is put; and (4) the steps taken by the resident 
to protect the area from the observation of people passing by. 480 U.S. at 301, 107 S.Ct. 
at 1139-40. The Court stated that it was not creating a bright-line rule or "finely tuned 
formula," but rather providing "useful analytical tools" with which to decide the central 
question of whether the area "is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be 
placed under the home's 'umbrella' of Fourth Amendment protection." Id. l 
Factors 1 and 2 are met as the tent was located dead center within the curtilage. 
Factor 3, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, is satisfied in that the area 
immediately surrounding a tent is used to get into and out one's home, store belongings 
that will not fit inside the tent, and cook, (Tr p 59, n 16-18). Factor 4, steps taken by a 
I State v Webb, 130 Idaho 462, (1997). 
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resident to protect the area from passersby militates for Beck in that the area where the 
can was located was not in a direct line of sight by respectful citizens passing by on the 
public trail. Office Urquhart established that the can was six to seven feet from the path, 
and behind a tree next to the tent: 
"Q Okay. And how close was the tree where you indicated the can was found to that 
path, approximately? 
A Approximately six to seven feet. 
Q So someone could throw a can down there real easily? 
A If they could curve it so it went around the tree and land between the Beck's tent and 
the tree.", (Tr p 58,11 19-25). 
Beck argues that if a can could not be thrown from the location on the trail and 
land where the can was found by law enforcement without the ability to "curve it", then 
the can could not be observed in that place either. Placing the can behind the tree where 
it could not be observed by a respectful citizen on the trail fulfills the 4th requirement 
under the Dunn, (supra), factors. The area where Beck's tent was pitched is a primitive 
campground next to Lucky Peak reservoir. Inherent in areas next to reservoirs are rocks, 
trees, bushes and elevation changes. Urquhart's testimony about "curve it" was 
dispositive of the issue of where the can was located, and it was not in a position where 
the officers outside of the curtilage could have seen it. 
The officers were present at the defendant's tent/residence on a trail approximately 
six or seven feet from his tent, which under the law, said tent is the same as his castle.2 
2 II Neither history nor this Nation's experience requires us to disregard the overriding respect for the 
sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic. II Payton 
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S.Ct. 1371, l387-88, 63 L.Ed.2d 639, 660 (1980). The respect for the 
sanctity of the home does not depend upon whether it is a mansion or hut, or whether it is a pennanent or a 
temporary structure. As stated eloquently by William Pitt, II 'The poorest man may in his cottage bid 
defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; 
the stonn may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot enter- -all his force dares not cross 
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The officers were there to speak with Beck about information they had received. The 
officers could observe Beck sleeping in his tent from the vantage point on the trail as his 
tent wall was collapsing. In order to retrieve a can that was found within a few feet of 
Beck's tent, (MEMORANDUM DECISION, ORDER AND APPELLATE JUDGMENT, 
(hereafter "MEMORANDUM DECISION"), pI), the officer had to intrude within a few 
feet of where Beck was sleeping with his girlfriend. There was no reason for officers to 
step onto the curtilage of the property. The following dialogue establishes the officers 
were within the curtilage off of the public trail prior to observing the can: 
Q. And you two officers were walking around the campsite and looking around 
before you woke people up, correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And they did not wake up at that point, correct? 
A. When we were walking around and through-
Q. Correct? 
A. The campsite? That's correct, (emphasis added, Tr p 59,114-11). 
"Through" means within the curtilage and onto the protected area of the campsite. 
Courts have extended Fourth Amendment protection to the curtilage, which is the area or 
buildings immediately adjacent to a home which a reasonable person may expect to 
remain private even though it is accessible to the public. State v. Rigoulot, 123 Idaho 267, 
272, 846 P.2d 918, 923 (Ct.App.l992). However, the presence of a police officer within 
the curtilage does not, by itself, result in an unconstitutional intrusion. State v. Clark, 124 
the threshold of the ruined tenement!' " Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 1195,2 
L.Ed.2d 1332, 1337 (1958) (quoting remarks attributed to William Pitt). 
A structure need not be one's "home" in order for the occupant to have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy there. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 1687-88, 109 L.Ed.2d 85, 92-93 
(1990). "'[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,' and provides sanctuary for citizens 
wherever they have a legitimate expectation of privacy." Id.at 96 n. 5, 110 S.Ct. at 1688 n. 5, 109 L.Ed.2d 
at 93 n. 5. 
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Idaho 308, 313, 859 P .2d 344, 349 (Ct.App.1993). Just as there is an implied invitation 
for citizens to access a house by using driveways or pathways to the entry, police with 
legitimate business are entitled to enter areas of the curtilage that are impliedly open to 
public use. Id. A criminal investigation is as legitimate a societal purpose as any other 
undertaking that would normally take a person to another's front door. Rigoulot, 123 
Idaho at 272,846 P.2d at 923. Therefore, when the police come onto private property to 
conduct an investigation or for some other legitimate purpose and restrict their 
movements to places ordinary visitors could be expected to go, observations made from 
such vantage points are not covered by the Fourth Amendment. Id. 
The Court of Appeals held in State v. Reyna, 142 Idaho 624, 130 P.3d 1162 (Idaho 
App. 2005), as follows: 
"Furthermore, there is an implied invitation for the general public to use and enter access 
routes to a house such as pathways, driveways, parking lots, and similar areas. State v. 
Prewitt, 136 Idaho 547, 551, 38 P.3d 126, 130 (Ct.App.2001). So long as the police 
remain in a place where a reasonable citizen would be (e.g the driveway), their intrusion 
is legal, even if the police are standing in the home curtilage without a warrant. 
See id. We conclude that, for the purpose of an arrest warrant with limitations, such an 
access-way would also be a "public place." 
In this case, once again, there was no reason to step onto the Beck's property and 
look around when their mission- waking the defendant up- could have been accomplished 
from the public trail. If the officers were close enough to awaken Beck, then they were 
close enough to discuss with Beck the purpose for their visit. In this case, the officers 
were walking within the cmiilage in order to look for paraphernalia, which is illegal 
without a search warrant. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held in United States v. 
Traynor, 990 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1993), as follows: 
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"The obvious implication of Dunn3 is that observations made by officers while they 
are not within the curtilage of a house do not constitute a search under the Fourth 
Amendment ... Under Dunn ... it does not matter that the officers first trespass upon a 
property that is obviously curtilage ... while investigating a tip, as long as the 
incriminating observations take place outside the protected curtilage." 
In State v. Linenberger, 151 Idaho 680, 263 P.3d 145, @ 149, (Idaho App. 2011), the 
court essentially defined how curtilage is defined by the type of structure when the 4th 
amendment applies: 
"Linenberger was using his boat as a residence at the time the detective knocked on 
the door. Therefore, it is appropriate to analogize linenberger's boat to a home. Just as a 
pathway to the entry of a home is considered curtilage and impliedly open to public use, 
when the detective used the pathway to the door of Linenberger's boat to knock and 
initiate contact as part of a criminal investigation, the detective did no more than enter 
the curtilage of Linenberger's home, impliedly open to public use. Further, there must be 
means by which police can knock on the door of a boat to initiate some sort of contact 
with the occupants. Otherwise, the boat would unreasonably be rendered a police-free 
zone. Accordingly, the district court was correct to conclude that, by doing no more than 
walking to the front door of Linenberger's boat to knock, the detective did not make an 
unconstitutional entry." 
In the present case, a tent does not have pathway to the front door, there is no 
doorbell to ring, and no door to knock on. The officers could complete their mission-
awakening and speaking with Beck, from their vantage point six to seven feet away on 
the public trail remote from where Beck was sleeping with his girlfriend. There was no 
reason for the officers to trespass into the curtilage in order to speak to Beck. 
Linenberger is dispositive on this issue- entrance into the curtilage is defined by the 
purpose for which law enforcement is intruding onto private property. The officers in 
this case intruded for purposes of locating paraphernalia, not to awaken Beck. 
3 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987). 
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This Court should also consider the unique features of living in a tent. The tent walls 
are the only safeguard from the outside world. Since the tent is one's home, every phase 
of living is done behind these walls, which could include eating, sleeping, matters of 
personal hygiene, and sex. 
Officer Urquhart's testimony clearly established that the can could not have been 
observed without illegally entering onto the property. The location of the can was behind 
a tree between the tree and Beck's tent, (Tr, p 58, 11 19-25), not visible from the public 
trail where the officers had a right to be, (see argument supra). 
B. Beck's 5th and 6th Amendment Rights against self-incrimination were violated by the 
unwarned and coercive questioning by law enforcement officers. 
The holding in Miranda v Arizona states that prior to any custodial interrogation 
initiated by law enforcement after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise 
deprived of his freedom in any significant way, that person must be afforded Miranda 
warnings. The two issues in determining if a suspect's Miranda rights have been violated 
are: if the suspect was in custody at the time of the questioning, and ifthe conduct by the 
police constituted an interrogation. 
CUSTODY 
The court assesses Miranda type custody under a totality of the circumstances 
approach viewed from the perspective of the reasonable person. 
Beck was in custody from a reasonable person's standpoint. The officer 
instructed Beck's girlfriend to wake him up, ordered Beck to sit in a lawn chair for 
reasons of officer safety, and did not tell Beck he was free to leave, (Tr p 18, 11 5-11; P 
27,1118-25, p 28, 111-6;). Further evidence of the coercive nature of this contact is 
established by state's witness Alex Urquhart when he testified that Officer Jones 
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"requested" that Beck sit in a lawn chair when Beck became belligerent, (Tr p 60, 11 16-
25, P 61, 111-5). Beck's affidavit further establishes that the contact with officers was 
custodial from the inception: Beck was awakened while sleeping in his personal 
residence 4 by uniformed, armed officers wearing badges, not afforded Miranda, did not 
feel free to ignore the officer's questioning, and was arrested as a result of the contact 
with officers, (Beck's affidavit submitted with the motion in magistrate's court, affirmed 
under oath at the ICR 12(b) hearing, and subject to cross-examination, (Tr p 64, 11 7-25; 
p 65,111-25; p 66,111-12), emphasis the author's). Beck argues that the Magistrate and 
the District Judge ignored the affidavit. The affidavit standing alone is sufficient to 
establish custody status, and Beck's testimony and the circumstances educed at the 
hearing establish Miranda warnings should have been given at a minimum. 
State v Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 651, holds: 
"Not all contacts between policemen and citizens constitute 
seizures of the individuals. A seizure occurs only when the 
officer, through physical force or show of authority, 
restrains an individual's liberty. The test to determine 
whether someone is restrained is whether, considering all 
of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police 
conduct would communicate to a reasonable person that he 
or she is not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go 
about his or her business." 
In this case, Beck was confronted with purported paraphernalia and questioned 
about prior drug uses sans Miranda warnings after being ordered to sit in a chair. The 
4 Personal residences are afforded the most protection under the 4th amendment and analogous provisions of 
the Idaho constitution, (Article r, Section 17). 
5 An officer's knowledge or beliefs may bear upon the custody issue if they are conveyed, by word or deed, to 
the person being questioned, Stansbury v California,_U.S._,_(1994). Gutierrez was using information from the 
defendant's sister and daughter to formulate questions during the interrogation. Gutierrez conveyed this 
knowledge to the defendant numerous times by accusing her of lying, informing her he will tell the judge she is 
lying, and informing her she will go to prison for her actions of the writing the checks, the very actions for 
which he is questioning her. 
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show of authority by armed/uniformed! badged police officers awakening and telling a 
suspect to sit in a chair is- once again, from a reasonable person's standpoint, the 
embodiment of custody and establishes that Beck was not free to ignore the officer's 
questioning and orders and to go about his business. 
INTERROGA nON 
"Interrogation" is defined as words or conduct by police that are "reasonably 
likely to elicit an incriminating response" from the suspect. 6 The standard is predicated 
upon the "perceptions of the suspect" but courts also consider the intent of the 
"reasonable police officer". Interrogation clearly embraces express questioning, that is, 
verbal statements by police to a suspect that are punctuated with question marks, (e.g., 
"What happened?"). But it also applies to any other verbal or nonverbal conduct that is 
the "functional equivalent" of express questioning even though not presented in the 
grammatical form of an interrogatory. 7 
In Innis, (supra), the Court held, "[The] term "interrogation" under Miranda refers 
not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of police 
(other than normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are 
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect", 
In this case, being confronted with the can and questioned about prior pot use, (Tr 
p 11,1116-25; p 12,111-25; p 13,111-9), constitutes interrogation likely to elicit an 
incriminating response. Beck was then questioned about the can the officer had found, 
(Tr p 14,113- 19). In response to the questioning, Beck eventually admitted to smoking 
pot, (Tr p 17,11 2-4). The officer acknowledged and testified that Beck denied 
6 Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291 
7 Id. @ 1689. 
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knowledge of the can, the officer continued to question Beck, and the Beck then made 
admissions/confessions, (Tr p 22, 11 7-25; p 25111-10), all without the benefit of Miranda 
warnings, (Tr p 24, 11 5-7). Continued questioning after multiple and explicit denials is in 
and of itself coercion- which is a step beyond the status of being unwarned. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the above cited reasons, Beck requests that this Court find that the evidence 
found as a result of the illegal search and seizure should have been suppressed, and the 
admissions/confessions made as a result of the illegal search and seizure and 
unwarned/coercive questioning by law enforcement should have been suppressed. 
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